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THE 1977 ILLINOIS DEATH PENALTY STATUTE: DOES IT
COMPLY WITH CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS?
Prior to 1972 the constitutionality of capital punishment was pre-
sumed by the United States Supreme Court.' The death penalty per se
had never been adjudicated by the Court in terms of the cruel and unu-
sual punishment clause of the eighth amendment2 as incorporated by
the fourteenth amendment. 3 Also, the fact that a majority of the states,
the District of Columbia, and the federal government provided for cap-
ital punishment by statute4 was a strong indication of the widespread
assumption of the constitutionality of capital punishment.
The first time the Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether capital punishment was violative of the cruel and unusual
punishment clause was in Furman v. Georgia.5 In that landmark deci-
sion the Court reviewed the imposition of the death penalty in three
specific cases. Two arose under the Georgia statute,6 and one arose
under that of Texas.7 In Furman the Court held that, as applied pursu-
ant to those statutes, the death penalty violated the eighth amendment. 8
The Court declared the Illinois capital punishment system unconstitu-
tional on the same day in Moore v. Illinois.9
The Furman decision consisted of nine separate opinions.' ° This
I. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 285 (1972).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (". . . nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted").
3. Eighth amendment inquiries by the Supreme Court prior to 1972 had focused on whether
particular methods of capital punishment were violative of the cruel and unusual punishment
clause. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); In re Kemmler, 136
U.S. 436 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878). Also, capital punishment and other
criminal penalties had been held unconstitutional as violative of the cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause where disproportionate to the crime. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). For a
thorough discussion of the background of capital punishment in the United States and the histori-
cal background of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment, see
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314-74 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
4. 408 U.S. 238, 385 (1972).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 239.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 239-40.
9. 408 U.S. 786, 800 (1972).
10. In the 5-4 Furman decision, only Justices Brennan and Marshall held that capital pun-
ishment was unconstitutional per se under the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 408 U.S. at
304-05 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 359, 360, 369 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justices Douglas,
Stewart, and White more narrowly held capital punishment unconstitutional where imposed
under discretionary statutes in an arbitrary manner. Id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at
309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 312-13 (White, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Relnquist dissented. Id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at
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made its rationale unclear and its precise directives difficult to discern.
However, since only two Justices held that capital punishment was per
se unconstitutional, most state legislatures believed that a properly
drafted statute would survive constitutional challenge.
Illinois was one of thirty-five states'" to enact a new death penalty
statute 12 in an effort to comply with the dictates of Furman. Neverthe-
less, in 1975 the Illinois Supreme Court in People ex rel Rice v.
Cunningham3 held this statute violative of the Illinois Constitution.'
4
The Illinois Supreme Court acted prior to any further constitutional
challenge of a death penalty statute in the federal courts. Following the
statute's invalidation in Cunningham, the drafting of a new statute in
the House Judiciary Committee of the Illinois General Assembly was
immediately begun.'5
New guidelines concerning death penalty procedure were set out
by the United States Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia'6 and its com-
panion decisions 7 during the summer of 1976. In these decisions, the
Supreme Court examined the death penalty statutes in five states. The
statutes of Georgia,' 8 Florida,' 9 and Texas2" were upheld, while those
of North Carolina 2' and Louisiana2 2 were found to be unconstitutional.
405 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 414 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 465 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing).
11. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 n.23 (1976) for a list of the states. Also, the
Congress of the United States passed the Antihijacking Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-366, 88 Stat.
409 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1472) which provided for imposition of the death penalty for any
death resulting from hijacking of an aircraft. 49 U.S.C. § 1472(n) (Supp. IV).
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 9-1, 1005-5-3, 1005-8-lA (1973) (amended 1977). For an
excellent legislative background and analysis of the 1973 statute, see generally Feature, The New
Illinois Death Penally. Double Constitutional Trouble, 5 Loy. U.L.J. 351 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as The New Illinois Death Penally].
13. 61 Ill. 2d 353, 336 N.E.2d 1 (1975).
14. Id. at 362, 336 N.E.2d at 7.
15. Telephone interview with Rep. Roman J. Kosinski (D.-Chicago), October 28, 1977 [here-
inafter cited as Kosinski interview]. Rep. Kosinski stated that most of the committee's work on the
statute was completed without the knowledge of what the Supreme Court would do in regard to
capital punishment.
16. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
17. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). [These cases,
together with Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), will hereinafter be referred to in the text and
the footnotes as the Gregg decisions.]
18. 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976). GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1101 (1972), 26-3102, 27-2534.1, 27-2537
(Supp. 1976). For purposes of this note, citations are to the statutes in effect at the time of the
Gregg decisions, with the exception of the two Illinois statutes.
19. 428 U.S. 242, 260 (1976). FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.082, 782.04 (West 1976), 921.141
(West Supp. 1976-77).
20. 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976). TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 19.03 (Vernon 1974), TEX.
CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1975-76).
21. 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1975).
22. 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976). LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (Supp. 1975) amending LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (West 1974).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
In addition to the Gregg decisions, the Court ruled on capital punish-
ment in four other instances in 1977.23
Illinois passed its new death penalty statute on June 21, 1977.24
This note will examine that statute in light of present standards as es-
tablished by the Supreme Courts of the United States and Illinois. It
will begin with the constitutional background of capital punishment
and the imposition of the death penalty after Furman. It will then set
forth the guidelines for imposition of the death penalty under Gregg
and post-Gregg decisions. Next the note will consider the constitu-
tional and statutory background of capital punishment in Illinois, and
it will conclude with an analysis of the new Illinois death penalty stat-




Although Furman was the first Supreme Court case in history to
address the issue of whether capital punishment violated the eighth
amendment, the Court had questioned capital punishment in another
context just one year prior to Furman. In McGautha v. California
2 5
the Court had considered the question of whether the imposition of the
death penalty was a violation of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. The same basic argument was presented in both
Furman and McGautha: it was alleged that a sentencing system that
provided no standards to aid the jury in its decision of whether to im-
pose the death penalty was arbitrary, and that such unguided jury dis-
cretion was therefore unconstitutional. The Court in McGautha held
that the lack of standards was not a violation of due process, stating
that "untrammelled" jury discretion had never been declared unconsti-
tutional.26 The following year, however, the Court indicated that stat-
utes which provided for arbitrary imposition of the death penalty at the
discretion of the jury violated the cruel and unusual punishment
clause. 27
23. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977); Roberts
v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977); and Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) [hereinafter re-
ferred to in the text and footnotes as post- Gregg decisions].
24. Public Act 80-26 (June 21, 1977). See appendix for the complete text of the 1977 Illinois
Death Penalty Statute. Since three of the post- Gregg decisions were decided in June, it is obvious
that they had no influence on the content of the bill.
25. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
26. Id at 207-08.
27. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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The Court never completely reconciled its position in McGautha
with Furman and its subsequent decisions on-capital punishment, but
McGautha was never explicitly overruled. Both Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Douglas have recognized this lack of consistency. It troub-
led Justice Douglas in his Furman opinion that the Court was "now
imprisoned in the McGautha holding."28 And Chief Justice Burger, in
his dissenting opinion, called the plurality opinion a complete rejection
of McGautha. He claimed that Furman presented a procedural due
process argument, and that the Court had in essence overruled
McGautha in the guise of an eighth amendment adjudication.29
The Furman Rationale
Because each United States Supreme Court Justice wrote a sepa-
rate opinion in Furman, the precise reason the death penalty statutes in
Texas and Georgia were found to be unconstitutional was unclear.
Examination of the various opinions illustrates the difficulty state legis-
latures were to have in drafting new statutes.
Justices Marshall and Brennan held that capital punishment was
per se unconstitutional,3" a position that both have consistently adhered
to in subsequent capital punishment cases.3 ' Justice Douglas, Stewart,
and White more narrowly held that capital punishment was unconstitu-
tional where imposed under discretionary statutes, those that left the
decision to impose or not to impose the death penalty entirely to the
discretion of the judge or jury.3 2 Such unbridled discretion led to arbi-
trary as well as discriminatory imposition of the death penalty.
Justice Douglas' opinion was based on an equal protection ration-
28. 408 U.S. 238, 248 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas had dissented in
McGautha, 402 U.S. 183, 226 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
29. 408 U.S. 238, 400 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Comment, Resurrection of
Capital Punishment-The 1976 Death Penalty Cases, 81 DICK. L. REV. 543, 564-65 (1977).
30. 408 U.S. 238, 257-306 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314-74 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Marshall's and Brennan's opinions closely follow the arguments as presented in the briefs of the
N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense Fund, and reflect in general the major arguments of capital punish-
ment opponents. England, Capital Punishment in the Light of Constitutional Evolution. An Analysis
of Distinctions Between Furman and Gregg, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 596, 597-98 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as England].
31. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring); id. (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 304 (1977) (Marshall, & Brennan, JJ., concurring);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (per curiam); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 364
(1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 365 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 227 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Marshall, J., concurring);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. (Marshall, J., concur-
ring).
32. 408 U.S. 238, 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id.
at 314 (White, J., concurring).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
ale: the death penalty was not applied equally to all.33 The poor and
black were more likely to receive the death penalty than were the rich
and white. Thus, discretionary statutes were unconstitutional in their
operation, a result that was "not compatible with the idea of equal pro-
tection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual'
punishments."34
Justices Stewart and White, on the other hand, said the death pen-
alty was unconstitutional where "freakishly", "wantonly", and "infre-
quently" imposed.35 Imposition on only a few persons out of all that
were eligible failed to serve any social ends, and was therefore cruel
and unusual.36 Justice White did, however, indicate in his opinion that
capital punishment, if properly administered, could serve legitimate
ends.
37
All four dissenting Justices agreed that the plurality opinions were
moral judgments that overstepped the boundaries of judicial review.
3
1
Although Justices Blackmun and Burger found capital punishment per-
sonally distasteful,39 the dissenters were unanimous in their belief that
capital punishment was a legislative matter.
It was to these dissenters coupled with the concurring opinions of
Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White, that the legislatures had to look
in drafting new statutes. In order to be upheld as constitutional, a stat-
ute would have to obtain the approval of at least one Justice in addition
to the four dissenting Justices. Since Justices Brennan and Marshall
believed capital punishment to be unconstitutional in any case, the ap-
proval would have to come from Justices Douglas, Stewart, or White. 4
Because Furman did not set out specific standards or guidelines,
the state legislatures received no definite direction in formulating new
death penalty statutes. The consensus of legislative opinion seemed to
be that a statute that eliminated or narrowed arbitrariness or discretion
in the imposition of the death penalty would be acceptable. Conse-
quently, the states were faced with three alternatives: they could abol-
ish capital punishment altogether,4 they could enact mandatory
33. Id. at 240-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 306-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310-14 (White, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 311-13 (White, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 375, 384, 404 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 410 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at
418 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 465-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 405-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
40. See The New Illinois Death Penalty, supra note 12, at 361-66. At present the composi-
tion of the Court remains the same as it was at the time of Furman, with the exception of one
Justice. Justice Stevens has replaced Justice Douglas.
41. Nine states had no capital punishment at the time of Furman: Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa,
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statutes, or they could enact statutes providing standards to aid judge
and jury in their imposition of the death penalty. Mandatory statutes
providing for capital punishment for certain specified crimes would
eliminate discretion entirely. The majority of states enacted either




For those who had welcomed Furman as an indication that the
Supreme Court might be ready to abolish capital punishment, the five
Gregg decisions were a source of disappointment. Gregg v. Georgia, for
the first time in history, reached the issue of whether capital punish-
ment was unconstitutional per se, and held that it was not.4 3 The Court
primarily relied on the overwhelming legislative response in the wake
of Furman.
Since historical and constitutional precedent firmly supported cap-
ital punishment,' it could only be adjudged violative of the eighth
amendment in terms of the constitutional tests traditionally applied to
determine whether or not a punishment was cruel and unusual, i e.,
whether it comported with contemporary standards of decency and
whether it was excessively severe.45
In applying the first test, the Court recognized that the eighth
amendment could not be regarded as a static concept; it must instead
"draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society."'  The Court then concluded that
contemporary standards of decency as indicated by the democratic
process since Furman did not reject capital punishment.47
As for the second test, a punishment was not excessively severe
where it served the legitimate purposes of retribution and deterrence
and was not disproportionate to the crime. The Court believed that ret-
ribution, although no longer the dominant objective, was nevertheless
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, West Virginia and Wisconsin. California's death penalty
had been abolished by the State Supreme Court in People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d
880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 405 U.S. 983 (1972), but it was reinstated by a referendum
which amended the constitution to authorize capital punishment. See England, supra note 30, at
600-01, nn.29-30.
42. See England, supra note 30, at 601-02.
43. 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976).
44. Id. at 174-76.
45. Id. at 173.
46. Id. (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
47. 428 U.S. 153, 179-81 (1976).
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essential in an orderly society.48 And while the deterrent effect of the
death penalty was still an unresolved question, it was not for the Court
to say that the judgment of the Georgia legislature was in error.49 The
Court did not find the death penalty disproportionate for the crime of
murder; rather it was "an extreme sanction, suitable to the most ex-
treme of crimes."50
After holding that capital punishment was not per se unconstitu-
tional, the Court decided whether the discretion encountered through-
out the entire criminal justice system rendered capital punishment
unconstitutional. The argument presented was that elimination of dis-
cretion only at the sentencing stage could not effectively resolve the
discretion problem. Nonsentencing discretion would have to be elimi-
nated as well in the areas of arrest, competence of counsel,
prosecutorial choice, plea-bargaining, grand jury indictment, jury de-
liberation, appellate review, and clemency.5' The Court held otherwise,
however.52 Since nonsentencing discretion was present in all criminal
areas, acceptance of that argument would be an indictment of the en-
tire criminal justice system.53 The Court interpreted Furman as prohib-
iting the imposition of the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious
manner, not prohibiting discretion at all levels of a criminal proceed-
ing.5 Nonsentencing discretion, therefore, was not unconstitutional
under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amend-
ment.55
Since the Court in Gregg did interpret Furman as mandating the
elimination or at least the minimizing of discretion in the capital sen-
tencing procedure, it concluded that a system that provided objective
standards to control sentencing discretion is constitutional.56 While
stating that the procedure provided by the Georgia statute was not the
48. Id. at 183.
49. Id. at 186.
50. Id. at 187.
51. This theme is presented again and again in post- Furman and post- Gregg decisions. See
Black, Due Processfor Death.- Jurek v. Texas and Companion Cases, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 1, 11
(1976); Comment, Capital Punishment After Furman, 64 J. CRIM. L. 281, 284-85 (1973); Note,
Capital Punishment. A Review of Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 261, 280
(1976); Note, Capital Punishment Statutes After Furman, 35 OHIO S.L.J. 651, 679 (1974); Com-
ment, Illinois'Post-Furman Capital Punishment Statute, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 440, 448-49; Comment,
Capital Punishment: Constitutional Parametersfor the Ultimate Punishment, 1 U. RICH. L. REV.
101, 117 (1976). Nonsentencing discretion as it affects the unique penalty of death remains a vul-
nerable issue, and it is not unlikely that a future court will find such discretion in violation of the
cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment.
52. 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976).
53. Id. at 225-26 (White, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 199.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 193-95.
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only permissible sentencing system,57 it held that Georgia's procedures
did satisfy the constitutional requirements of Furman8 It likewise
found the procedures in Florida59 and Texas60 satisfactory.
In contrast, the Court found the procedures in North Carolina 6'
and Louisiana62 to be unconstitutional. These states had mandatory
death penalty statutes which effectively eliminated all discretion. The
Court commented that society had long ago rejected automatic death
penalties as being too harsh and rigid. Since they were then too
marked a departure from contemporary standards of decency,
mandatory death penalty statutes were held violative of the eighth and
fourteenth amendments.63
A Further Guideline
The five Gregg decisions all involved crimes of murder. One year
later in Coker v. Georgia' the Court was asked to decide whether a
sentence of death for a rape conviction was constitutional. The de-
fendant was charged with escape, armed robbery, motor vehicle theft,
57. Id. at 195.
58. Id. at 196-98. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1101 (1972), 26-3102, 27-2534.1, 27-2537 (Supp.
1976).
59. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259-60 (1976). FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.082, 782.04
(West 1976), 921.141 (West Supp. 1976-77).
60. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976). TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 19.03 (Vernon
1974), TEX. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1975-76).
61. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301-05 (1976). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17
(Supp. 1975).
62. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1976). LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (Supp.
1975) amending LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (West 1974).
63. Roberts v. Lousiana, 428 U.S. 325, 332 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 301-03 (1976).
64. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). Unlike Coker, the other three post- Gregg decisions did not pertain
to issues that Furman had left unresolved. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977), held that
failure to disclose a confidential presentence report used by the judge to impose the death penalty
after the jury had advised life imprisonment was a violation of due process. Gardner is relevant
in the area of evidence rules to be employed in the sentencing procedure of a capital case. See
note 112 infra. Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977), involved another unsuccessful chal-
lenge of Louisiana's mandatory statute under the subparagraph which provided a mandatory
death penalty for the murder of a police officer. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977), should
be noted for its implications in the capital punishment area. The challenge here was that imposi-
tion of the death penalty was unconstitutional as an ex postfacto law, since the statute had not
been in effect at the time the murder had occurred. The Court rejected that argument, holding
that since the changes in the death penalty were procedural and ameliorative, there was no expost
facto violation. This holding is of particular interest in Illinois, since the first constitutional chal-
lenge to the new death penalty statute is already in progress. William R. Hill was sentenced to
death under the new Illinois statute in Cook County on October 19, 1977, for murders committed
prior to the existence of a constitutional death penalty statute. See Wolfson, Warren D., A
Hypothetical Case Under the New Illinois Death Penalty Statute, 4 CRIM. JUST. NEWSLETTER 9
Dec., 1977.
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kidnapping, and rape. 65 There were two aggravating circumstances 6
6
present: conviction for a prior capital felony and commission of the
rape in the course of the commission of another capital felony, that of
armed robbery.67 The Court held that death was a grossly dispropor-
tionate and excessive punishment for the rape of an adult woman,
thereby violating the eighth and fourteenth amendments.68
In determining whether a punishment was disproportionate to the
severity of the crime, the Court stated that public attitudes, history and
precedent, legislative attitudes, and response of juries should be consid-
ered.69 Looking for guidance in history, the Court noted that a majority
of the states had not authorized a death sentence for rape in the past
fifty years." Also, since only three of thirty-five new statutes provided
for the death penalty for rape7' and nine out of ten juries had not im-
posed the death penalty for rape,72 legislative and jury attitudes con-
firmed the Court's judgment that capital punishment was
disproportionate for the rape of an adult woman.
7 3
In his dissent Chief Justice Burger stated that the implication of
the Coker holding was that capital punishment was appropriate for
murder only.74 Whether it is constitutional to impose the death penalty
for any crimes other than murder has yet to be adjudicated.
In summary, the Gregg decisions and Coker resolved five issues
that had been left unanswered by Furman. First, capital punishment
is not unconstitutional per se; second, nonsentencing discretion
throughout the entire criminal justice system is not unconstitutional;
third, death penalty statutes for certain categories of murder that pro-
vide objective standards to guide judge and jury are constitutional;
fourth, mandatory death penalty statutes are unconstitutional; and
finally, capital punishment is not an appropriate penalty for the rape of
an adult woman.
65. 433 U.S. 584, 587 (1977).
66. Aggravating circumstances refer to those factors present in a particular crime that render
it a capital offense. They can be statutorily specified and include such things as the murder of a
police officer or fireman, murder for hire, prior history of conviction for capital crimes, or commis-
sion of the offense during the commission of another felony.
67. 433 U.S. 584, 588-89, 591 (1977).
68. Id. at 592.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 593.
71. Id. at 594.
72. Id. at 597.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 621 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
A determination of constitutionally acceptable standards or guide-
lines to be provided in a death penalty statute can be made by an
examination of the acceptable statutes in conjunction with their
interpretation by the Supreme Court in the Gregg decisions. It is
equally important to examine the unacceptable statutes for what they
failed to provide. From such an examination it is possible to extract the
standards deemed essential by the Court, as well as those merely
deemed desirable.
Bifurcated Proceeding
A separate sentencing hearing following the determination of guilt
seems to be the preferable procedure for imposition of the death pen-
alty. Both the Florida statute75 and the Texas statute76 specifically
provide for a separate sentencing hearing; the Georgia statute77 is not
explicit. The Court, however, referred to the bifurcated trial provided
by the Georgia statute in Gregg v. Georgia,7" and indicated that it was
the best system.7 9 While not deemed essential, a bifurcated proceeding
is thus favored in capital cases.
The bifurcation of a capital trial is preferable because it allows the
judge or jury to consider every fact prior to the imposition of the death
penalty. Without a bifurcated proceeding, irrelevant and inadmissible
facts would be barred. Such an approach would deprive judges and
juries in capital cases of the fullest possible knowledge of all facts sur-
rounding the particular crime. Ideally, death penalty determinations
should be made by judges and juries that have considered every vital
fact.80
Aggravating Circumstances
The Georgia statute provides that the judge or jury consider any of
ten specified aggravating circumstances"1 that might be supported by
the evidence. Except in cases of treason or aircraft hijacking, there
must be a finding of at least one of these aggravating circumstances in
75. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.082, 782.04 (West 1976), 921.141 (West Supp. 1976-77).
76. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 19.03 (Vernon 1974), TEX. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art.
37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1975-76).
77. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1101 (1972), 26-3102, 27-2534.1, 27-2537 (Supp. 1976).
78. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
79. Id. at 190-92.
80. See generally Davis, The Death Penalty and the Current State of the Law, 14 CRIM. LAW
BULL. 7, Jan./Feb. (1978) [hereinafter cited as Davis].
81. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(!)-(10) (Supp. 1976).
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order to impose the death penalty. 2 Florida's statute specifies eight ag-
gravating circumstances, 83 and one or more of these must be present to
warrant the death penalty.84
The Texas statute does not specify aggravating circumstances as
such. Like Florida, Texas restricts the imposition of the death penalty
to murder, but it narrows the categories of murder to five specified situ-
ations.85 The Court in Jurek v. Texas86 believed that this narrowing
served much the same purpose as a statutory list of aggravating circum-
stances, particularly since each of the five corresponded to aggravating
circumstances in the Georgia and Florida statutes. 87 Although the pres-
ence of such an aggravating circumstance was determined in the guilt
stage, it was required prior to the imposition of the death penalty and
was, therefore, satisfactory. The important factor was a focusing on
the particularized nature of the crime.88
Thus, a consideration of aggravating circumstances must be pro-
vided in a death penalty statute. These can either be specifically set
out in the statute, or the statute can alternatively specify certain catego-
ries of murder. There is no prescribed number.
Mitigating Circumstances
The Court specifically stated in Jurek that mitigating circum-
stances must be considered prior to a sentence of death.89 Although the
Texas statute lacked statutory mitigating circumstances, the Court
found this requirement satisfied by the submission of three issues to the
jury in the sentencing stage of the trial.9 Since the Texas statute pro-
vided for guidance and objective consideration by the jury of the par-
ticular circumstances of both the offense and the offender prior to
imposing the death penalty, the Court found its procedure constitu-
tional.9'
The Florida statute specifies seven mitigating circumstances which
are to be balanced against the statutory aggravating circumstances in
the deliberation of the jury. Specific mitigating circumstances are not
provided by the Georgia statute, but there must be a consideration of
82. Id., § 27-2534.1(c).
83. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(a)-(h) (West Supp. 1976-77).
84. Id., § 9 21.141(3)(a).
85. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 19.03(a)(I)-(5) (Vernon 1974).
86. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
87. Id. at 270.
88. Id. at 274.
89. Id. at 271.
90. Id. at 272-74.
91. Id. at 276.
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"any" mitigating circumstances. The Court stated in Proffitt v.
Florida92 that the use of aggravating and mitigating circumstances re-
quired a focusing on the particular crime and the character of the de-
fendant.93 Similar language is found in the Gregg holding: "We hold
that the death penalty is not a form of punishment that may never be
imposed, regardless of the circumstances of the offense, regardless of
the character of the offender, and regardless of the procedure followed
in reaching the decision to impose it."94
Thus, at a minimum, the Court requires individualized considera-
tion of the particular crime and the particular defendant. It is because
of the impossibility of satisfying this minimum standard that
mandatory death penalty statutes were held unconstitutional in Wood-
son v. North Carolina95 and Roberts v. Louisiana.9 6 The Court added
that a mandatory death penalty statute also fails by not providing
standards to guide the jury.9 7
Consideration of mitigating circumstances also is essential, though
these circumstances need not be statutorily specified. A specific list
would seem to be the most efficient way to focus attention in an indi-
vidualized manner, but the exact method is left to the states. Again,
there is no prescribed number.
Appellate Review
Prompt automatic review of a sentence of death is provided by all
three of the acceptable statutes. The review in Florida and Georgia is
by the respective Supreme Courts,98 while the Texas statute provides an
automatic review by the Court of Criminal Appeals.99 This procedure
insures that the death penalty is not imposed arbitrarily, and that it is
not disproportionate in comparison with similar cases.
In Roberts, the Court specifically stated that mandatory death
penalty statutes failed for not providing for review of a death sen-
tence. " Therefore appellate review is an essential factor in any consti-
tutional death penalty statute.
92. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
93. Id. at 251.
94. 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).
95. 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1975).
96. 428 U.S. 325, 333 (1976). LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (Supp. 1975) amending LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (West 1974).
97. 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976).
98. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(4) (West Supp. 1976-77); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(a)
(Supp. 1976).
99. TEX. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 37.071(f) (Vernon Supp. 1975-76).
100. 428 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1976).
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Standards of Proof
The Georgia statute provides that a finding of an aggravating cir-
cumstance must be beyond a reasonable doubt.'' Similarly, each of
the three issues submitted to the jury under the Texas statute must be
proved by the state beyond a reasonable doubt. "2 The required stan-
dard of proof is not specified in the Florida statute. The reason for the
omission could be due to the fact that the jury's finding is advisory; the
judge imposes the death penalty only after reweighing all the circum-
stances.
The Court has not specifically addressed the standard of proof to
be utilized in a capital sentencing hearing. The safest approach in
drafting a death penalty statute would seem to be an inclusion of the
beyond reasonable doubt standard, at least where the finding of the
death penalty is by the jury.
Rules of Evidence
Both the Florida and Texas statutes provide for an expansion of
evidence rules beyond ordinary criminal rules. 03 Georgia makes no
such provision; thus, this standard is optional.
Although the expansion of evidence rules has not been addressed
by the Supreme Court, its desirability corresponds to that of bifurcated
procedures. Death penalty determinations are best made by a fully
informed jury, and facts vital to such a determination could be prohib-
ited under ordinary criminal evidence rules."
Written Findings
Written findings of the specific aggravating circumstances by judge
or jury are required by the Georgia statute if the death penalty is im-
posed. 0 5 Under the Florida statute the judge is required to set forth in
writing the findings upon which the death sentence is based.' 6 The
Texas statute makes no specific reference to written findings.
The Supreme Court in Proffitt mentioned that written findings
provided for a meaningful appellate review.0 7 However, there has
been no indication that they are essential to a statute's constitutionality.
101. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(c) (Supp. 1976).
102. TEX. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 37.071(c) (Vernon Supp. 1975-76).
103. Id., art. 37.071(a); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1) (West Supp. 1976-77).
104. See Davis, supra note 80.
105. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(c) (Supp. 1976).
106. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (West Supp. 1976-77).
107. 428 U.S. 242, 251 (1976).
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Here, too, the safest approach would be to include a provision for writ-
ten findings.
In summary, the minimum standard required of a constitutional
death penalty statute is an individualized consideration of both the
crime and the defendant followed by automatic review. 10 8 Individual-
ized consideration is best achieved by the use of aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances, "°and bifurcated proceedings are preferred."t 0
Specifying that proof be beyond a reasonable doubt, expanding the evi-
dence rules, and requiring written findings." t are desirable options. 1 2
With the objective guidelines thus determined, an analysis of the
new death penalty statute in Illinois will readily indicate whether it
comports with those standards.
THE DEATH PENALTY IN ILLINOIS
Background
The death penalty in Illinois at the time of Furman could be im-
posed for three offenses: murder, aggravated kidnapping, and trea-
son. 1 3 The statute provided for a bifurcated proceeding in that the
defendant's guilt was first determined, followed by a separate post-trial
sentencing hearing. No specific findings were required. In cases
where the defendant waived the right to jury trial, the judge could im-
pose the death penalty. But a sentence of death could only be recom-
mended by the jury in a jury trial, and the judge's concurrence was
necessary in order for the death penalty to be imposed. If the jury
recommended mercy, the judge could not impose the death penalty.
108. See text accompanying notes 75-100 supra.
109. See text accompanying notes 81-97 supra.
110. See text accompanying notes 75-80 supra.
111. See text accompanying notes 101-07 supra.
112. Historically and practically, different evidence rules have governed in trial and sentenc-
ing procedures. This is due to a recognition that intelligent and individualized imposition of
punishment might be inhibited by the stricter open court rules. See Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241 (1949). Likewise, the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard that is mandatory in the
guilt determination during the trial stage is not necessarily applicable in the sentencing stage.
However, more recently the Court held that it was a denial of due process to impose the death
penalty when based on information that defendant had no opportunity to challenge or explain.
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977). Although not explicitly overruling Williams, the
Court believed that it was necessary to reevaluate capital sentencing procedures in light of evolv-
ing standards of procedural fairness since the death penalty was now recognized as different from
other punishments. The Court also stated that in order to comply with Furman the confidential
report had to be made part of the record on appeal. Id. at 360-61. Hence Gardner lends support
to the contention that proof beyond a reasonable doubt, expansion of evidence rules, and written
findings are desirable options in any death penalty statute. Further constitutional challenges could
well arise in these areas.
113. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 9-1(b), 10-2(b)(1), 30-1(c) (Supp. 1972) (amended 1973 and
1977).
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But where the jury recommended death, the judge could choose to im-
pose life imprisonment. 1
14
It was presicely this type of discretionary sentencing system that
was forbidden by Furman. The Supreme Court held the Illinois death
penalty statute unconstitutional in Moore v. Illinois,"5 citing their
holding of that same day in Furman v. Georgia." 1
6
In 1970 the citizens of Illinois had approved by referendum the
1970 Illinois Constitution, which by implication provided for capital
punishment.117 In this same referendum, Illinois' voters had also cho-
sen not to abolish capital punishment by approximately a two-to-one
margin. 18 The enactment of a new Illinois death penalty statute in No-
vember, 1973,119 can be seen as both a response to the voters of Illinois
and to the mandate of Furman.
The 1973 Illinois Death Penalty Statute
The basic provisions of the 1973 Illinois death penalty statute: 1)
narrowed capital offenses to murder; 120 2) provided that the particular
murder had to fall within one of six classifications specified as aggra-
vating circumstances;' 2 ' 3) directed that if parts 1 and 2 were present, a
three-judge panel was to be appointed by the chief judge of the circuit
court to hear evidence in a special sentencing hearing;122 and 4) if a
majority of the judges determined one of the circumstances existed and
found no compelling reasons for mercy, the death penalty was
mandatory. 123 The findings of the panel had to establish the appropri-
ateness of the death penalty beyond a reasonable doubt. 24 Appeal was
to be provided in two stages: the first to determine error as in all crimi-
nal appeals; the second, in the absence of error, to determine if the
death penalty was imposed in a discretionary manner or was dispropor-
tionate, considering both the crime and the defendant.
125
114. See The New Illinois Death Penalty, supra note 12, at 352-53.
115. 408 U.S. 786 (1972).
116. Id. at 800.
117. ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 7, 9; art. VI, § 4(b). These four sections contain such language
as "deprived of life", "a crime punishable by death", "capital offenses", and "a sentence of death".
118. Kosinski interview, supra note 15. See also The New Illinois Death Penalty, supra note
12, at 388-89.
119. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 9-1, 1005-5-3, 1005-8-IA (1973) (amended 1977).
120. Id., § 9-1(b).
121. Id., § 1005-8-IA(l)-(6).





The constitutionality of the 1973 statute was decided by the Illinois
Supreme Court in September, 1975. At that time there had been no
further challenges of death penalty statutes at the federal level since
Furman.'26 People ex rel Rice v. Cunningham'27 addressed four dif-
ferent aspects of the statute: the three-judge panel, the aggravating cir-
cumstances, the "compelling reasons for mercy" clause, and the
procedure for appellate review.
In Cunningham, the court held that the legislature was without au-
thority to create a three-judge panel to impose the death penalty.
28
That power was vested in the Supreme, Appellate, and Circuit Courts
of Illinois. 129 The court also held that the three-judge panel of circuit
court judges was constitutionally defective in that each judge was de-
prived of the jurisdiction that was vested in him alone.' 30 However, the
enumerated situations or aggravating circumstances requiring the im-
position of the death penalty were held proper; they were not too vague
and uncertain.1 3' Next, the "compelling reasons for mercy" clause was
found to be unconstitutional because no standards or guidelines or con-
siderations of the particular defendant were provided.' 32 Finally, the
procedure for appellate review was unconstitutional because it was in
direct conflict with article VI, section 4(b) of the Illinois Constitution,
which provides for direct appeal of the death penalty to the Illinois
Supreme Court. 1
33
Since the three constitutional defects were so dependent that they
were not severable, the entire statute was held unconstitutional. 34 Thus
Illinois was without an operable death penalty statute for a second
time.
The 1977 Illinois Death Penalty Statute
The Illinois Supreme Court decision in Cunningham invalidating
the 1973 death penalty statute provided no guidelines for formulating a
126. Since a determination of whether the 1973 statute would have survived a constitutional
challenge on the federal level would be merely speculation, a discussion of that subject is unneces-
sary. It did, however, have several serious flaws: 1) the complete elimination of the jury at the
sentencing stage, 2) the vagueness of the "compelling reasons for mercy" clause, and 3) the lack of
specified consideration of the particular crime and particular defendant until the second stage of
the appellate review.
127. 61 111. 2d 353, 336 N.E.2d 1 (1975).
128. Id. at 359, 336 N.E.2d at 5.
129. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § I.
130. 61 Ill. 2d 353, 361, 336 N.E.2d 1, 6 (1975).
131. Id., 336 N.E.2d at 6.
132. Id., 336 N.E.2d at 6.
133. Id. at 362, 336 N.E.2d at 6. See ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b).
134. d., 336 N.E.2d at 7.
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new death penalty statute. Nevertheless, several bills were promptly in-
troduced in the Illinois General Assembly.
The most important of these was the Kosinski-Sangmeister bill.' 35
The drafters of this bill had taken into consideration a great variety of
materials, 136 but were working without the benefits of the Gregg stand-
ards or guidelines, which were not rendered until the following sum-
mer. While incorporating many features of the 1973 statute, the bill
contained substantial changes in areas that were defective in an attempt
to conform with Furman and Cunningham.
37
The House Judiciary II Committee took the best components from
various proposed bills, and with many modifications, incorporated
them into House Bill 10.138 The bill in its final form passed both
Houses on June 14, and was approved by Governor James Thompson
on June 21, 1977.'13
The 1977 Illinois death penalty statute was basically in the same
form as the Kosinski-Sangmeister bill, with some additions and some
deletions. 4 ° Its main provisions are: 1) a defendant found guilty of
murder who has attained the age of eighteen may be sentenced to death
in seven specified situations, called aggravating factors;' 4 ' 2) where the
135. H.B. 3204, 79th Gen. Ass., State of Illinois (1975 and 1976), sponsored by Rep. Roman
J. Kosinski (D.-Chicago) and George E. Sangmeister (D.-Mokena).
136. Materials considered were: the 1970 Illinois Constitution, Illinois case law, post-
Furman case law in other states, the Model Penal Code, the post- Furman death penalty statutes of
other states, and the death penalty provisions of S.1, the legislation before the United States Sen-
ate Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal Laws, which was proposing revision of the federal crimi-
nal code. See Garner, Mitchell, Cui. B.A. YOUNG LAW. J., Jan./Feb., 1976, at 4. [hereinafter
cited as Garner]
137. See Garner, Jan./Feb., supra note 136, at 4.
138. Kosinski interview, supra note 15.
139. Chicago Tribune, June 22, 1977, § I at 1, col. 2. In a televised press conference, Gover-
nor Thompson signed the bill, commenting that the vast majority of Illinois' citizens supported it.
He stated that the statute fit Supreme Court guidelines in his opinion and in those of his legal
advisors. He also predicted that there would be a court test prior to imposition of the death
penalty in Illinois, and estimated that it would take five years. Ironically, Thompson had partici-
pated in the prosecution of the last person to be executed in Illinois as an assistant State's Attor-
ney. James Duke, convicted killer of a police officer, died in the electric chair in Cook County
Jail on August 24, 1962.
140. There are only two significant differences between the statute and House Bill 3204.
One is that the statute nowhere specifies that judge and jury findings in the separate sentencing
hearing be written, and the other is that it provides that the aggravating and mitigating factors
may include but need not be limited to the statutorily enumerated ones. Most of the other
changes are fairly technical, although a mitigating factor is added pertaining to the absence of a
history of criminal activity. There is also an additional aggravating factor pertaining to murder
of a witness in a prosecution against the defendant. The crimes of armed robbery, deviate sexual
assault, forcible detention, and burglary have been added to the felony murder factor. And the
alternative term of imprisonment is not specified as a minimum of fourteen years in the new
statute.
141. Public Act 80-26, § 9-1(b)(1-7) (June 21, 1977). See appendix for the complete text of
the 1977 Illinois Death Penalty Statute.
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state requests, a separate sentencing hearing shall be conducted to de-
termine the existence of any of the seven aggravating circumstances or
any of the five mitigating factors; 42 3) the hearing shall be conducted
before a jury, or by judge alone where defendant waives the jury; 143 4)
rules of criminal evidence are to govern any information as to aggra-
vating factors, whereas any information as to mitigating factors can be
presented regardless of admissibility under criminal rules;'" 5) the
state must prove the existence of any aggravating factors beyond a rea-
sonable doubt; 145 6) if there is no finding of an aggravating factor, de-
fendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment;146 7) if the finding of
an aggravating factor is unanimous, the judge or jury shall consider
aggravating and mitigating factors; 147 8) if there is a unanimous finding
that no mitigating factor is present, defendant is sentenced to death,
whereas he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment if the finding is not
unanimous;148 and 9) there is automatic review of a death sentence by
the Illinois Supreme Court in accordance with its rules.
14 9
Analysis
On the federal level the new Illinois death penalty statute should
encounter no constitutional problems. It has restricted capital punish-
ment to the offense of murder, which has been held constitutional when
administered under a proper statute. 5 ° It provides for individualized
consideration of the particular murder and the particular defendant by
statutorily specifying both aggravating and mitigating factors. '5' It pro-
vides for automatic review by the Illinois Supreme Court of any death
sentence.152 In addition, the statute provides for the preferred bifur-
cated sytem,5 3 and is defendant-oriented in that the rules of evidence
are expanded in his favor. 154 Any evidence regardless of admissibility
under ordinary criminal trial rules may be presented to show the pres-
ence of a mitigating factor; conversely, criminal rules of evidence must
be adhered to by the state in showing the presence of an aggravating
142. Id., § 9-1(d).
143. Id., § 9-1(d)(1-3).
144. Id., § 9-1(e).
145. Id., § 9-1(0.
146. Id., § 9-1(g),(h).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id., § 9-1(i).
150. See text accompanying notes 50, 56-60 and 141 supra.
151. Public Act 80-26, § 9-1(b)(c) (June 21, 1977). See text accompanying note 93 supra.
152. See text accompanying notes 100 and 149 supra.
153. See text accompanying notes 78-79 and 142 supra.
154. See text accompanying note 144 supra.
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factor. The presence of an aggravating factor must be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt.' 55 Even further, the Illinois statute requires a
unanimous finding that no mitigating factor is present for the imposi-
tion of the death penalty,156 a protection of the defendant not found in
any of the other three constitutional statutes.
The only desirable standard not found in the Illinois statute is that
of written findings. However, since this has not been deemed an essen-
tial standard by the Supreme Court, its absence should not make the
statute constitutionally defective. The lack of a specific provision for
written findings in the Texas statute supports this premise. 57
The advantage of written findings is that they provide for easier
appellate review. Since the statute provides that review of a death sen-
tence be in accordance with rules promulgated by the Illinois Supreme
Court, it is feasible that written findings will be adopted by court rule.
In that event, the Illinois death penalty statute would substantially con-
form with every constitutional standard deemed essential and desirable
by the United States Supreme Court.
Although the Illinois statute will most likely survive any federal
constitutional challenge, there is a potential problem concerning the
review process.'"I In obvious deference to the authority of the Illinois
Supreme Court, the new statute is vague in that it does not specify the
procedures to be followed on review. While satisfying the concerns of
Cunningham in this respect, it does not specifically insure that similar
results are reached in similar capital punishment cases. The Georgia
statute is very specific in this regard, whereas the Illinois statute resem-
bles the Florida and Texas statutes. In Profitt the United States
Supreme Court found that the Supreme Court of Florida did review
each death sentence to insure similarity of result in similar cases.' 59
Therefore, it can be expected that the review procedures employed by
the Illinois Supreme Court will be closely scrutinized by the United
States Supreme Court. 6° As with the written findings standard, this
feature could also be adopted by court rule.
It is unlikely that the new statute contains any constitutional flaws
on the state level.' 6 ' It has effectively eliminated the three defects inval-
155. See text accompanying note 145 supra.
156. See text accompanying note 148 supra.
157. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 19.03 (Vernon 1974).
158. See generally Illinois Supreme Court Review, Constitutional Law, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 254,
273-74 [hereinafter cited as Illinois Supreme Court Review].
159. 428 U.S. 242, 253 (1976).
160. Illinois Supreme Court Review, supra note 158, at 274.
161. This is not to say that the implementation of the statute is without procedural difficul-
ties. See Wolfson, A Hypothetical Case Under the New Illinois Death Penalty Statute, 4 CRIM.
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idated by the Illinois Supreme Court in Cunningham. It has elimi-
nated the three-judge panel, substituted mitigating factors for the vague
"compelling reasons for mercy" clause, and complied with the Illinois
Constitution by providing for direct review by the Illinois Supreme
Court rather than review on an intermediate level. In its addition of
mitigating factors it has primarily relied on those suggested in the
Model Penal Code.' 62 These are part of the Florida statute approved by
the Supreme Court in Proffitt.
There are two related potential state constitutional problems. The
first is that the statute does not statutorily limit aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances, and could therefore be struck for vagueness.
1 63
Second, there is a possible constitutional infirmity in that capital pun-
ishment is in conflict with the section of the 1970 Illinois Constitution
which provides for restoration of offenders to useful citizenship.'
64
It seems unlikely that the Illinois Supreme Court will hold that the
statute is unconstitutional for either vagueness or because of the con-
flict for several reasons. First, the rehabilitation issue was present in
the Cunningham case and the Illinois Court did not address it at that
time. Second, the United States Supreme Court has meanwhile held
that capital punishment per se is not unconstitutional. 65 And finally,
one of the specified mitigating factors is the absence of a history of
prior criminal activity. This will provide for an examination of the
defendant's rehabilitation potential. 166 Also, a determination of reha-
bilitation potential would be aided by not statutorily limiting the aggra-
vating and mitigating factors. These two features thus minimize any
potential conflict. This could be an explanation as to why the legisla-
tors opted for the open-ended provision in the 1977 death penalty stat-
ute. They may well have considered the vagueness problem less of a
risk than the potential conflict.
CONCLUSION
Given the same composition of the Supreme Court, capital pun-
ishment will not be held cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the eighth and fourteenth amendments in the near future. A majority
JUST. NEWSLETrER 9, Dec., 1977, for a demonstration of unanswered procedural questions raised
by the new statute.
162. Model Penal Code § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
163. Telephone interview with Mitchell Garner, Assistant State's Attorney, October 31,
1977. (Mr. Garner's statements represented his personal views and not those of the State's Attor-
ney's Office.)
164. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11.
165. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976).
166. Illinois Supreme Court Review, supra note 158, at 275.
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of the Court believes such a judgment to be beyond the scope of judi-
cial review, whatever its personal views on the subject. In addition, the
democratic process has overwhelmingly indicated its support for capi-
tal punishment for a very narrow category of crimes. 167 Until the day
when society rejects capital punishment, or a United States Supreme
Court no longer feels compelled to defer to the legislative process on
the matter of life or death, the death penalty must be imposed in as
rational a way as possible. The 1977 Illinois Death Penalty Statute has
most likely achieved that goal.*
CATHERINE H. MCMAHON
167. House Roll Call, 80th Gen. Ass., State of Illinois, H.B. 10, March 10, 1977. The vote
was 119 for; 41 against. Senate Roll Call, 80th Gen. Ass., H.B. 10, June 2,1977. The vote was 40
for; 13 against. In addition to the strong vote in support of the new death penalty statute, Rep.
Kosinski and Mr. Garner both indicated that there is overwhelming support for capital punish-
ment in Illinois today that exceeds that shown in the 1970 referendum, and that this same support
exists throughout the country. See notes 15 and 163 supra.
* After this book was sent to press, the United States Supreme Court decided two additional
capital punishment cases, both of which arose under the Ohio death penalty statute. See Lockett
v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2954 (1978); Bell v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2977 (1978). A plurality consisting of Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens concluded in both cases "that the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case,
not be precluded from considering as a mitigatingfactor, any aspect of a defendant's character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers." Id. at 2965 and
2980. Since the Ohio statute limited the sentencer's consideration of mitigating circumstances, it




The 1977 Illinois Death Penalty Statute, ILL. REV. STAT., ch.
38, §§ 9-1, 1005-5-3, 1005-8-lA (1973) (amended 1977) provides:
Section 1. Section 9-1 of the "Criminal Code of 1961", ap-
proved July 18, 1961, as amended, is amended to read as follows:
(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justifica-
tion commits murder if, in performing the acts which cause the
death:
(1) He either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that
individual or another, or knows that such acts will cause death to
that individual or another; or
(2) He knows that such acts create a strong probability of
death or great bodily harm to that individual or another; or
(3) He is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than
voluntary manslaughter.
(b) Aggravating factors. A defendant who at the time of the
commission of the offense has attained the age of 18 or more and
who has been found guilty of murder may be sentenced to death if:
1. the murdered individual was a peace officer or fireman
killed in the course of performing his official duties and the defend-
ant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was a
peace officer or fireman; or
2. the murdered individual was an employee of an institution
or facility of the Department of Corrections, or any similar local cor-
rectional agency, killed in the course of performing his official duties,
or the murdered individual was an inmate at such institution or facil-
ity and was killed on the grounds thereof, or the murdered individual
was otherwise present in such institution or facility with the knowl-
edge and approval of the chief administrative officer thereof; or
3. the defendant has been convicted of murdering two or more
individuals under subsection (a) of this Section or under any law of
the United States or of any state which is substantially similar to
Subsection (a) of this Section regardless of whether the deaths oc-
curred as the result of the same act or of several related or unrelated
acts so long as the deaths were the result of either an intent to kill
more than one person or of separate premeditated acts; or
4. the murdered individual was killed as a result of the hi-
jacking of an airplane, train, ship, bus or other public conveyance; or
5. the defendant committed the murder pursuant to a contract,
agreement or understanding by which he was to receive money or
anything of value in return for committing the murder or procured
another to commit the murder for money or anything of value; or
6. the murdered individual was killed in the course of another
felony if:
(a) the murdered individual was actually killed by the defend-
ant and not by another party to the crime or simply as a consequence
of the crime; and
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(b) the defendant killed the murdered individual intentionally
or with the knowledge that the acts which caused the death created a
strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered
individual or another; and
(c) the other felony was one of the following: armed robbery,
robbery, rape, deviate sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, forcible
detention, arson, burglary, or the taking of indecent liberties with a
child; or
7. the murdered individual was a witness in a prosecution
against the defendant, gave material assistance to the state in any
investigation or prosecution of the defendant, or was an eye witness
or possessed other material evidence against the defendant.
(c) Consideration of factors in Aggravation and Mitigation.
The court shall consider, or shall instruct the jury to consider any
aggravating and any mitigating factors which are relevant to the im-
position of the death penalty. Aggravating factors may include but
need not be limited to those factors set forth in subsection (b). Miti-
gating factors may include but need not be limited to the following:
1. the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal ac-
tivity;
2. the murder was committed while the defendant was under
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, although
not such as to constitute a defense to prosecution;
3. the murdered individual was a participant in the defendant's
homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act;
4. the defendant acted under the compulsion of threat or men-
ace of the imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm;
5. the defendant was not personally present during commis-
sion of the act or acts causing death.
(d) Separate sentencing hearing.
Where requested by the State, the court shall conduct a separate
sentencing proceeding to determine the existence of factors set forth
in Subsection (b) and to consider any aggravating or mitgating fac-
tors as indicated in Subsection (c). The proceeding shall be con-
ducted:
1. before the jury that determined the defendant's guilt; or
2. before a jury impanelled for the purpose of the proceeding
if:
A. the defendant was convicted upon a plea of guilty; or
B. the defendant was convicted after a trial before the court
sitting without a jury; or
C. the court for good cause shown discharges the jury that de-
termined the defendant's guilt; or
3. before the court alone if the defendant waives a jury for the
separate proceeding.
(e) Evidence and Argument.
During the proceeding any information relevant to any of the
factors set forth in Subsection (b) may be presented by either the
State or the defendant under the rules governing the admission of
evidence at criminal trials. Any information relevant to any addi-
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tional aggravating factors or any mitigating factors indicated in Sub-
section (c) may be presented by the State or defendant regardless of
its admissibility under the rules governing the admission of evidence
at criminal trials. The State and the defendant shall be given fair
opportunity to rebut any information received at the hearing.
(f) Proof.
The burden of proof of establishing the existence of any of the
factors set forth in Subsection (b) is on the State and shall not be
satisfied unless established beyond a reasonable doubt.
(g) Procedure-Jury.
If at the separate sentencing proceeding the jury finds that none
of the factors set forth in Subsection (b) exists, the court shall sen-
tence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of
the Unified Code of Corrections.' If there is unanimous finding by
the jury that one or more of the factors set forth in Subsection (b)
exist, the jury shall consider aggravating and mitigating factors as
instructed by the court and shall determine whether the sentence of
death shall be imposed. If the jury determines unanimously that
there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of
the death sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to death.
Unless the jury unanimously finds that there are no mitigating
factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence the
court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under
Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.
(h) Procedure-No Jury.
In a proceeding before the court alone, if the court finds that
none of the factors found in Subsection (b) exists, the court shall sen-
tence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of
the Unified Code of Corrections.
If the Court determines that one or more of the factors set forth
in Subsection (b) exists, the court shall consider any aggravating and
mitigating factors as indicated in Subsection (c). If the Court deter-
mines that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the
imposition of the death sentence, the Court shall sentence the de-
fendant to death.
Unless the court finds that there are no mitigating factors suffi-
cient to preclude the imposition of the sentence of death, the court
shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chap-
ter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.
(i) Appellate Procedure
The conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to auto-
matic review by the Supreme Court. Such review shall be in accord-
ance with rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.
(j) Disposition of reversed death sentence.
In the event that the death penalty in this Act is held to be un-
constitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States or the State
of Illinois, any person convicted of murder shall be sentenced by the
!. Chapter 38, § 1005-1-1 et seq.
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court to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified
Code of Corrections.
In the event that any death sentence pursuant to the sentencing
provisions of this Section is declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court of the United States or of the State of Illinois, the
court having juridsiction over a person previously sentenced to death
shall cause the defendant to be brought before the court, and the
court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under
Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.
Section 2. Section 5-5-3 of the "Unified Code of Corrections",
approved July 26, 1972, as amended, is amended to read as follows:
Sect. 5-5-3. Disposition
(a) Every person convicted of an offense shall be sentenced as
provided in this Section.
(b) When a defendant is found guilty of murder the State may
either seek a sentence of imprisonment, under Section 5-8-1 of this
Code, or where appropriate seek a sentence of death under Section 9-
1 of the Criminal Code of 1961.

